This paper shows that the result of Krishna (2002, 2005), i.e., the non-monotonicity in the comparative statics across regimes, disappears, if exporters differ in their productivities, which provides very different predictions about the results of policy changes. Krishna (2002, 2005), i.e., the non-monotonicity in the comparative statics across regimes, disappears, if exporters di¤er in their productivities, which provides very di¤erent predictions about the results of policy changes.
Introduction
Trade and domestic policies are often conditional: certain conditions must be met to obtain certain bene…ts. Content protection schemes in developing countries are one example. They require …rms in an industry to use at least some level of domestic inputs. Free Trade Area preferences for members are another example. Producers in the FTA become eligible for zero tari¤s on their exports to a partner if the product meets Rules of Origin (ROOs) or special constraints that must be met in order to obtain origin. Otherwise, they pay the going tari¤. Our paper argues that …rm Department homogeneity plays a key role in the analyses of such policies. By using a particular policy, the level of ROOs in the FTA, for illustrative purposes, we show that a key result of these analyses vanishes when …rm heterogeneity is allowed. This provides a cautionary note in interpreting such results. Krishna (2002, 2005) show that even when …rms are homogeneous, assuming they all make the same choices is not correct. Ex ante identical …rms can behave di¤erently in equilibrium if they are indi¤erent between their alternatives. They show that there are two possible regimes:
in the homogeneous regime all …rms choose the unique most pro…table option. In their example, content protection requires greater use (than dictated by cost minimization considerations alone) of the domestic input, labor. When all …rms want to meet this requirement, a stricter restriction shifts the demand for labor, raising its price. In the other regime, the heterogeneous one, some …rms choose one option while others choose the other. Indi¤erence between these options must be maintained as the restriction becomes stricter. At given wages, stricter ROOs make pro…ts from meeting the requirement fall below those from not doing so. To keep pro…ts equal, input prices must fall! As a result, the comparative statics for input prices, and through them for other variables, are exact opposites in the two regimes. Previous work, they argued, was thus incomplete, as it only dealt with the homogeneous regime, and misleading, as it had very di¤erent comparative statics properties from the heterogeneous one.
In this paper, we show that this is not the entire story either. Introducing di¤erences in …rm productivity, which is also more consistent with the empirical evidence 1 , leads to another margin of adjustment, namely, the identity of the marginal …rm, eliminating the non-monotonicity in the comparative statics which is the key result in Krishna (2002, 2005) . In fact, the comparative statics properties are always like those associated with Ju and Krishna's heterogeneous regime rather than those of the standard homogeneous regime! In the presence of …rm heterogeneity, 1 See, for example, Kramarz (2004, 2005) . stricter requirements change the composition of …rms. These changes produce the same monotonic adjustments in endogenous variables in both regimes.
We model ROOs similarly to Demidova, Kee and Krishna (2006), allowing ROOs to a¤ect both the …xed and marginal costs of exporting and introduce …rm heterogeneity as in Melitz (2003) .
The Model
Consider a small country with L consumers, each of which supplies one unit of labor. Preferences over a continuum of domestically produced goods indexed by v and imported good z are given by
where is the set of available domestic varieties; q(v) is the consumption of variety v; and = and z = RP 1 p z ; where R is the aggregate expenditure, and P is the price index, P 1 =
We normalize the price of the imported variety p z to 1.
There is a continuum of monopolistically competitive heterogenous …rms of a …xed mass M . 2 The productivity distribution is Pareto with cumulative function G (') = 1
; > : A …rm with productivity level ' has 1 ' per-unit labor requirement.
The …rm may also choose to export. The foreign demand 3 for domestic variety v is Bp x (v) ,
i.e., we are dealing with a small open economy that has no impact on the rest of the world. Each exporter pays a per-unit tari¤ > 1 and a …xed cost f x . In addition, it can pay a documentation …xed cost d and invoke the preferences it has been given. However, to access these preferences, it has to meet some ROOs; which allow the …rm to escape paying < 1 share of tari¤ ; but involve an additional per-unit cost > 1; since now the product has to satisfy origin requirements. The cost functions 4 of producing q units for domestic and foreign markets are, respectively,
where w is the wage. As a result, the prices set in each case are, respectively,
For simplicity we assume there are no …xed costs of producing for the domestic market. Thus, all …rms in the economy use this option. Moreover, the revenues and pro…ts earned by a …rm with productivity level ' are, respectively 5 ,
; and r x;ROO (') = B w ( ) '
1
; and
Thus, a …rm maximizes d (')+max f0; x (') ; x;ROO (')g : We can rewrite x;ROO (') as x (')+
x;r (') ; where x;r (') = B w '
wd is additional pro…ts from invoking ROOs. 6 Let us de…ne two productivity cuto¤s, ' x and ' x;ROO ; so that
= wf x ; and (1)
Only …rms with ' > ' x export, and …rms with ' > ' x;ROO invoke ROOs while exporting. Note 4 The subscript denotes the option used by a …rm, i.e., "d" denotes domestic production, "x" denotes exporting without ROOs, and "x,ROO" denotes exporting with ROOs:
5 An Appendix with detailed proofs and derivations is available upon request. 6 Similarly, we can de…ne rx;r (') = rx;ROO (') rx (') as additional revenues from invoking ROOs: that if > 1; then no …rm will invoke ROOs: We assume that < 1: From (1) and (2),
i.e., if A ROO > 1, ' x;ROO > ' x . Thus, we need to consider two cases. First, if ROOs are relatively strict and documentation costs are large, then A ROO > 1 and only the most productive exporters meet ROOs. This is analogous to the heterogenous regime in Krishna (2002, 2005) , where the restriction is strict enough so that …rms are not strictly better o¤ meeting it. Second, if ROOs are lax and documentation costs are small, then A ROO 1 and all exporting …rms meet ROOs.
This is analogous to the homogeneous regime in Ju and Krishna (2002, 2005).
The Heterogenous Regime. If A ROO > 1; then ' x;ROO > ' x ; i.e., only some share of exporters invoke ROOs: As depicted in Figure 1(a) , the pro…ts of exporters are linear in ' 1 :
Moreover, the line corresponding to x (') is ‡atter than the line corresponding to x;ROO ('), since < 1; and has a higher intercept. The intersection of these lines gives the productivity cuto¤ ' x;ROO ; so that …rms with ' > ' x;ROO export with invoking ROOs and getting tari¤ preferences as additional pro…ts from doing so cover the documentation cost d. Firms with ' 2 [' x ; ' x;ROO ) export without meeting ROOs; while …rms with ' < ' x do not export at all. Aggregate income in the economy is given by the sum of wages and rents 7 : R = wL + d + x + x;r ; where
7 Since M is …xed, rents are not competed away ex ante and so must enter income. 
There are 2 unknown variables, ' x and w 8 , and 2 equilibrium conditions: the supply side of the economy represented by (1) and the demand side represented by the trade balance condition:
Using (4) and the fact that P 1 = 1 1+ ; the left hand side of (5) can be rewritten as
, and the right hand side of (5) can be written
: By equalizing them, we get our …nal equilibrium condition:
where
( 1) > 0 since > 1: Note that from (1), w is increasing in ' x ; while 8 ' x;ROO can be found from (3). (1) (6) from (6), w is decreasing in ' x : We can depict both relationships in Figure 2 (a). The intersection of two curves gives w and ' x in the equilibrium.
If ROOs become stricter, i.e., if d or rises, then A ROO rises and
shifting the curve corresponding to (6) down as shown in Figure 2 (b), and reducing ' x and w in the equilibrium. Substituting for w in terms of ' x in using (1), and using (3); results in
The only variable in (7) is ' x;ROO : Stricter ROOs increase A ROO ; which raises the right hand side of (7), and as a result, ' x;ROO must rise. Thus, stricter ROOs raise ' x;ROO :
Proposition 1 When not all …rms export by invoking preferences, stricter ROOs reduce the wage while reducing the export cuto¤ and raising the cuto¤ for those invoking ROOs:
The intuition behind these results is the following. First, assume that wage does not change as
ROOs become stricter. Then, the pro…ts of exporters, who do not invoke ROOs; remain unchanged.
But the productivity cuto¤ of exporters who meet ROOs rises, while their mass falls. Thus, the aggregate pro…ts from exporting, x + x;r ; as well as consumers'income, fall, reducing the demand for each domestic variety and the demand for labor. The equilibrium in the labor market cannot be restored through the exit of …rms, thus, wage must fall, making exporting without ROOs more attractive so that the productivity cuto¤ for exporters ' x falls.
The Homogeneous Regime. The analysis is very similar to that above. When A ROOs 1, all exporters invoke ROOs: As depicted in Figure 1(b) , the intersection of two lines lies below the horizontal axis. Thus, there is only one productivity cuto¤ in the equilibrium, ' x;ROO ; de…ned as
Aggregate expenditure in the economy R = wL
; and M x;ROO = ' x;ROO M: There are 2 unknown variables, ' x;ROO and w; and 2 conditions, (8) and the trade balance condition
Using the same technique as before, it can be rewritten as
Thus, if ROOs become stricter, i.e., if d; ; or rises, then w must fall. Moreover, from (9),
(f x + d) ' x;ROO must fall, i.e., ' x;ROO must rise. The intuition in this case is the same as before: at a given w, stricter ROOs raise the productivity cuto¤ of exporters all of whom invoke ROOs; reducing their number, aggregate income and the labor demand, so that wage has to fall.
Finally, note that whether or not all exporters meet ROOs; stricter ROOs always reduce wages and raise the productivity of those who meet ROOs. Thus, even in the "homogeneous case"changes in the extensive margin prevent wages from rising in response to stricter ROOs:
Conclusion
What should we take away from this simple exercise? We see our results as not being merely a comment on the generality of an existing paper but as having a broader message. If, as seems empirically indisputable, …rms di¤er in their productivities, making the traditional assumption that …rms are identical and behave identically will give the opposite result from allowing for heterogeneity.
Why? Because the adjustment on the extensive margin is large and overwhelms the response on the intensive margin. As ROOs become tighter, …rms that continue to meet ROOs demand more labor, raising wages. This e¤ect operates via the intensive margin. But …rms who stop meeting ROOs demand less labor, pushing wages down. This extensive margin adjustment dominates! Models which only allow for the intensive margin to operate may, thus, give very misleading results.
